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THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE
Abstract: There is something strange about the literature produced in the
1990s by North American constitutional theorists on the relationship
between constitutionalism and democracy. The problem, I believe, has two
different roots: an excessive focus on the legitimacy of judicial review and
an insistence in defending the constitutional status quo. On the one hand,
the emphasis on judicial review usually ended up obscuring what should
have been at the center of the debate: the way in which ordinary citizens
could or not re-constitute the fundamental laws under which they lived.
On the other, these approaches rarely involved recommendations for
institutional changes (other than the occasional proposal for the abolition
of judicial review) in the constitutional regimes they were operating.
These 'happy endings' were particularly surprising, since one would think
there must be many ways of upsetting the 'balance' between
constitutionalism and democracy in favor of the latter. In fact, it would be
astonishing that constitutional traditions which originated in an attempt to
protect certain institutions from the passions of disorganized multitudes
would not be wanting, even a bit, from the point of view of democracy.
With these limited ends, it is no surprise that the constitutionalismdemocracy debate appears to have stagnated.
This paper will advance a different approach to the debate, one that
emphasizes popular participation in constitutional change and that
recommends institutional transformations that would contribute to the
realization of democracy in contemporary constitutional systems. I begin
by reviewing the works of Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Bruce
Ackerman. The take of these three authors on majority rule, judicial
review, and constitutional amendments, exemplify very well the
shortcomings of the literature on constitutionalism and democracy. The
implications of Dworkin's constitutional theory are fatal for any
democratic project: the prettification of a constitutional regime that is
reputed to rest on the 'right' abstract principles. Waldron's approach,
although attributing to 'the people' the right to have the constitution they
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want, ends up identifying people and legislature, thus neglecting any
actual participation of citizens in constitutional change. Ackerman's
constitutional politics, although insisting in keeping citizens and
representatives separate, replaces the flesh and blood human beings that
live under the constitutional regime with a mythical 'People' (always with
a capital P) whose acts are identified ex post facto.
In contrast to these theories, I propose a conception of constitutionalism
according to which the constitution should remain permanently open to
important transformations. Under this 'weak' constitutionalism, there is no
such thing as a 'good' or 'finished' constitution, contrary to what Dworkin's
analysis implies. Only such a conception of constitutionalism, I believe, is
consistent with a serious commitment to the democratic ideal. However,
this supposes that democracy is not exhausted in legislatures and daily
governance, but that it extends to deliberating and deciding on the very
content of the constitution. In this respect, and in contrast to Waldron, I
will defend a distinction between two dimensions of the democratic ideal:
democracy at the level of daily governance and democracy at the level of
the fundamental laws. By their very nature (daily vs. episodical), each of
these dimensions demand different levels of popular engagement. Finally,
I consider the institutional implications of this approach to the
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma. Unlike Ackerman, I suggest a
series of mechanisms designed to allow for the actual participation of
ordinary citizens in the constitution and re-constitution of government.
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THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY
DEBATE
Joel I. Colón-Ríos *

There is something strange about the literature produced in the 1990s by
North American constitutional theorists on the relationship between
constitutionalism and democracy. The problem, I believe, has two
different roots: an excessive focus on the legitimacy of judicial review and
an insistence in defending the constitutional status quo. On the one hand,
the emphasis on judicial review usually ended up obscuring what should
have been at the center of the debate: the way in which ordinary citizens
can or cannot re-constitute the constitution under which they live. On the
other, these theorists rarely advanced recommendations for institutional
changes in the constitutional regimes they were operating (other than the
occasional proposal for the abolition of judicial review). These happy
endings -in which constitutionalism and democracy were usually
presented as two sides of the same coin- were particularly surprising, since
one would think there must be many ways of upsetting the 'balance'
between constitutionalism and democracy in favor of the latter. In fact, it
would be astonishing that constitutional traditions which originated in an
attempt to protect certain institutions from the passions of disorganized
multitudes would not be wanting, even a bit, from the point of view of
democracy. With these limited ends and inclinations, it is no surprise that
the constitutionalism-democracy debate appears to have stagnated.
It is tempting to say that behind the lack of recognition of any real
conflicts between these two ideals and the absence of proposals directed
toward an increase in the participation of citizens in the re-reproduction of
the fundamental laws laid a profound fear of what could result from
popular involvement in constitutional change. In other words, a mistrust in
the ability of fellow citizens to engage in discussions of high principle, an
insuperable attachment to the 'beauties' of judicial interpretation, and a
*
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self-imposed responsibility to find arguments that support the less popular
features of the established constitutional tradition. But this would be
unfair: constitutional theorists engaged in the constitutionalism-democracy
debate (including those whose work I will consider here) generally had an
honest commitment to some version of the ideal of 'the rule of the people'.
Perhaps the very framework of the debate prevented these theorists from
assuming stronger democratic positions, even if in a few cases this attitude
was the result of a political commitment to liberal constitutionalism pure
and strong; its anti-populist splendor at its maximum. The actual reasons
for this apparent deficit of democratic enthusiasm, however, is not what
interests me here. Rather, my goal is to explore the main tendencies to the
constitutionalism-democracy debate, identify its shortcomings, and build
from there the basic contours of a decidedly and unrepentant democratic
constitutional theory, one in which citizens have a real possibility of
becoming protagonists of important constitutional transformations.
Accordingly, this paper presents an approach to the constitutionalismdemocracy dilemma that emphasizes popular participation and considers
some specific mechanisms that would contribute to the realization of
democracy in contemporary constitutional systems. I begin with a short
introduction to the dilemma and a brief account of the work of Ronald
Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Bruce Ackerman. The take of these three
authors on majority rule, judicial review, and constitutional amendments,
exemplify very well what I believe are the three main tendencies in the
literature on constitutionalism and democracy.i The implications of
Dworkin's constitutional theory are fatal for any democratic project: the
prettification of a constitutional regime that is reputed to rest on the 'right'
abstract principles. Waldron's approach, although attributing to 'the people'
the right to have the constitution they want, ends up identifying people and
legislature, thus neglecting any actual participation of citizens in
constitutional change. Ackerman's constitutional politics aims at keeping
citizens and representatives separate, but at the price of replacing the flesh
and blood human beings that live under the constitutional regime with a
mythical 'People' (always with a capital P) whose acts are to be identified
ex post facto.
In contrast to these theories, I propose a conception of constitutionalism
according to which the constitution should remain permanently open to
democratic transformations. Under this 'weak' constitutionalism, there is
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no such thing as a 'good' or 'finished' constitution (which might evolve
through constitutional interpretation, but whose provisions must be
insulated from democratic majorities), contrary to what Dworkin's analysis
implies. Only such a conception of constitutionalism, when accompanied
by a strong democracy, is consistent with a serious commitment to the
democratic ideal. However, this supposes that democracy is not exhausted
in legislatures and daily governance, but that it extends to deliberating and
deciding on the very content of the constitution. In this respect, and in
contrast to Waldron, I will defend a distinction between democracy at the
level of daily governance and democracy at the level of the fundamental
laws. By their very nature (daily vs. episodical), each of these dimensions
demand and allow different levels of popular engagement. Finally, I
consider some of the institutional implications of my approach to the
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma. Unlike Ackerman, I suggest a
series of mechanisms designed to allow for the actual participation of
ordinary citizens in the constitution and re-constitution of government.
These mechanisms include constituent assemblies convened 'from below'
and popular initiatives to amend the constitution, institutions already
present in some constitutional regimes. Although an important part of the
paper is devoted to the examination and critique of the work of three
American authors, my substantive proposals are not directed toward any
specific country. They are, rather, examples of ways in which
constitutionalism might be 'democratized', and in that respect, invitations
to move the constitutionalism-democracy debate to more strongly
democratic grounds.

I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
The constitutionalism-democracy dilemma, the idea that constitutionalism
and democracy are in tension (or in conflict) which each other, is not only
a matter of constitutional theory. In fact, this problem has been the object
of judicial treatment in several cases which, in one way or another,
touched upon the fundamental principles of the juridical order in question.
In North America, one of these cases is the Secession Reference, where
the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of the unilateral
secession of Quebec.ii In an attempt to balance democratic and
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constitutional principles, the court held that the Canadian constitution
(which does not contain a provision allowing provinces to secede from
Canada) could not be legitimately circumvented even if a majority of
Quebeckers voted in favor of secession. According to the court, the
Canadian conception of democracy is not a mere system of majority rule
but, taken in conjunction with other constitutional principles, involves the
idea “that the political representatives of the people of a province have the
capacity and the power to commit to be bound into the future by the
constitutional rules being adopted”iii. In this sense, far from negating
democracy, constitutionalism creates an orderly framework that allows
people to make political decisions: “Viewed correctly, constitutionalism
and the rule of law are not in conflict with democracy; rather, they are
essential to it”iv.
One year later, the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela examined a
similar issue. The case before the Supreme Court did not involve the
secession of a political unit from a federation, but the creation of a new
constitutional regime through a procedure not contemplated by the
constitution's amendment rule. The controversy originated when the then
recently installed government called for a referendum that asked the
Venezuelan electorate whether they wanted to convene a constituent
assembly in order to re-constitute the republic. The amendment procedure
of the 1961 Constitution, however, placed the amending power exclusively
in the ordinary legislature. Not surprisingly, many jurists argued that to
convene a constituent assembly was contrary to the established juridical
order and would require a previous constitutional amendment. In a
decision that accepted the existence of a tension between constitutionalism
and democracy, the court held that the limits established in the constitution
regarding the Congress’ power of amendment applied only to that body
and not to the people in the exercise of their constituent power.v
The decisions of these two courts, operating in different contexts and in
countries with dissimilar political histories, exemplify with unsuspected
clarity one of the basic problems of constitutional theory: democrats
finding in constitutions a nuisance and constitutionalists perceiving
democracy as a threat.vi A preliminary overview of the central
characteristics of these two ideals suffices to show why. Democracy, in the
most traditional sense, is about self-government. Its basic idea is that
citizens themselves decide the content of the laws that organize their
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political association and regulate their conduct.vii This supposes not only
popular participation in the constitution of government, but that there can
be no fixed law, that is, a law that has to be taken for granted and that is
not -or should not be- subject to revision. A democratic regime is a regime
in which citizens not only adopt ordinary and fundamental laws, but can
also change them: a system that remains open to democratic
transformations. These democratic features (which I will elaborate later)
appear to be contradicted by constitutionalism in two related but not
identical ways. First, constitutionalism seeks to limit the kinds of laws that
can be created by legislative majorities, a limit that is usually
institutionalized through the adoption of judicial review of legislation.
Second, and as part of a general concern with constitutional stability and
supremacy, constitutionalism also places limits on the faculty of citizens
to alter the fundamental law; it mandates a constitution that can only be
altered with difficulty, usually by legislative supermajorities. As I will
argue below, the solutions given by Dworkin, Waldron, and Ackerman to
this apparent conflict are too deferential of constitutionalism and, as a
result, come short of giving democracy its due.viii

A. THE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS DEMOCRACY SOLUTION
Through his career, Ronald Dworkin has insisted that the alleged tension
between constitutionalism and democracy is the result of a
misunderstanding and exaggeration. In his view, those who maintain that
there is something undemocratic about constitutionalism fail to understand
what democracy is really about.ix It is true, he says, that democracy means
government by the people, but the majoritarianism defended by some
democrats is simply based on a mistaken conception.x Such a view cannot
explain what is good about democracy, incorrectly assuming that the mere
weight of numbers, on its own, contributes something of value to a
political decision.xi The correct understanding of the ideal of the 'rule by
the people' is to be found in what he calls the 'constitutional conception' of
democracy (and more recently the 'partnership view')xii. Not surprisingly,
this view rejects the majoritarian premise and replaces it with a result
oriented view of democracy: “that collective decisions be made by
political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all
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members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and
respect”xiii.
This means that democracy is about protecting individual rights, because
they are the rights that will guarantee that the state treats (or abstain from
treating) citizens in certain ways. It is easy to see how Dworkin derives a
defense of judicial review of legislation from this approach: if the decision
of a court strikes down a statute adopted by a legislative majority (or by
the unanimous vote of the population for that matter) because it violates
individual rights, there is no loss to democracy but a democratic victory.
When one translates this view into the language of constitutional law and
into a specific type of constitution, Dworkin's solution to the
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma can be seen more clearly. For him,
a constitution serves democratic ends insofar as it contains the right
abstract principles. Who created the constitution, who is allowed to change
it and how is secondary: the democratic credentials of a country’s
fundamental laws depend not on when or by whom those laws were made,
but on their content.xiv
Thus, for example, if the fundamental laws provide for “more-or-less
popularly accountable day-to-day government based on a more-or-less
equally distributed franchise; for non-discriminatory law making and
prohibition of caste distinctions; for protection against arbitrary and
oppressive uses of state powers; [and] for strong rights of moral
autonomy…”, we have a democratic regime.xv Understood in this way,
democracy is not only compatible with the disabling provisions of a
traditional liberal constitution, but is identified with the existence of those
provisions. Dworkin, as a good constitutionalist, would not want a
constitution that contains the right content to be easily changed, so he
defends a difficult and state-driven amendment procedure. In his view, the
kind of constitution necessary for democracy is identical to the one
required by constitutionalism: one that contains certain rights, that sets
limits to popular decision making, and that cannot be easily altered.xvi His
preferred constitution promises permanency to the principles and
institutions that it protects, whose scope and meaning is to be determined
by judges. According to Dworkin, there is no conflict whatsoever between
constitutionalism and democracy, because if one looks closely, they are
really one and the same.
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B. THE LEGISLATURE AS THE PEOPLE SOLUTION
Some readers will be surprised to see Jeremy Waldron's name included in
a group of scholars whose work is supposedly wanting from a democratic
perspective. After all, Waldron has denounced, together with a radical
democrat like Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the dirty little secret of
contemporary jurisprudence: its discomfort with democracy.xvii Shouldn't
Waldron's focus on popular participation, his defense of legislatures, and
his sustained attack against judicial review, be enough to satisfy even the
most recalcitrant democrat? For this author the democratic character of
laws depends on who made them and by what procedures they came into
existence, and he appears to leave no space for constitutionalism's
insistence on legal limits to popular decision-making. The problem is that
Waldron does not take his democratic instincts far enough, that popular
participation does not mean much if it is thought to take place inside a
parliament. And in his procedural conception of democracy this is
precisely what happens.
For Waldron, people have a right to participate in equal terms in all
aspects of their community’s governance, that is, not just in interstitial
matters of social and economic policy but also in social decisions of high
principle.xviii The very idea of rights is based on a view of the rights-bearer
as a thinking agent, someone who is capable of moral deliberation and of
transcending personal interest, and this involves giving a special place to
the right to participate in all aspects of the community's governance.xix
This does not mean that the right to participate has moral priority over
other rights, but that when there is disagreement about what rights people
have or about what those rights entail (and disagreement about rights is
simply inevitable), the exercise of the right to participation is the most
appropriate for settling the dispute.xx This is another way of saying that
there cannot be a democracy unless the demos has the last word on
important political decisions, and that “the people or their representatives”
determine (using majority-rule as a decision-making method)xxi the
principles of their association and the content of their laws.xxii
This approach is of course incompatible with judicial review of legislation,
which gives the judiciary the power to trump the decisions of the majority.
Even if Waldron agrees with Dworkin on key questions of political
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morality (such as abortion or the death penalty) he thinks that legislatures,
as the duly representatives of the people, are the ones to deliberate and
provide an answer to these questions: “In countries that do not allow
legislation to be invalidated in this way [through judicial review], the
people themselves can decide finally, by ordinary legislative procedures,
whether they want to permit abortion, affirmative action, school vouchers,
or gay marriage”xxiii . Accordingly, a system that gives the citizens or their
representatives (notice here Waldron’s problematic identification of
people and legislature)xxiv the power to decide what will be the content and
scope of constitutional guarantees is potentially a true and complete
democratic victory. Thus, the tension between constitutionalism and
democracy is nothing but a product of the limits imposed by judicial
review on a democratically elected legislature. If the power to impose
these limits is abolished, the tension between constitutionalism and
democracy would disappear.

C. THE PEOPLE AS 'THE PEOPLE' SOLUTION
Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional theory is very well known and has been
the object of many discussions and critiques. Although focused in the U.S.
constitutional tradition, I think it is possible to extend his theory to other
liberal democracies. Ackerman’s central claim emerges from the idea that
the United States has a dualist constitution. By that, he means that the
constitution seeks to distinguish between two different kinds of decisions:
(a) decisions by the government; and (b) decisions by ‘the people’.xxv
Ackerman identifies the former as normal politics and the latter as
constitutional politics. These latter periods of higher law making conform
the ‘highest kind of politics’, the moments in which ‘We the People’ speak
without being restrained by pre-established constitutional forms. Because
of its extraordinary character, constitutional politics should be permitted to
take place only during the rare moments of what Ackerman calls
“heightened political consciousness”xxvi .
During times of normal politics, in contrast, it is only the government who
speaks. Political representation must be seen with suspicion, and the
actions of the legislature should not be mistaken for the genuine voice of
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‘We the People Assembled’.xxvii The idea is that the legislative and
executive powers merely represent the people in a manner of speaking,
“each is a metaphor that should never be confused with the way the People
express their will during those rare periods of constitutional politics when
the mass of American citizens mobilizes itself in a collective effort to
renew and redefine the public good”xxviii . Ackerman is easily able to derive
a defense of judicial review from this conception: because ordinary
representatives are only ‘stand-ins’ for the People, they might attempt to
jeopardize the fundamental laws created during moments of constitutional
politics. The role of judicial review is precisely to protect the
achievements of the People during those extraordinary episodes: “Until a
constitutional movement successfully amends our higher law, the Court’s
task is to preserve the People’s judgments against their erosion by normal
lawmaking”xxix .
This author's approach to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma is
quite different from that of Dworkin and Waldron. For him,
constitutionalism and democracy are neither about the protection of
individual rights through judicial review nor about parliamentary
supremacy: they are about preventing ordinary politicians from taking the
place of the People. In fact, he rejects both 'right foundationalism' (the
idea that the first and foremost concern of the constitution is to protect
rights, even if this means invalidating the decisions taken by democratic
institutions)xxx and 'monism' (the idea of granting plenary making
authority to the winners of the last election).xxxi Instead, he urges us to
distinguish between decisions made by the People and decisions made by
the legislature, and as goods democrats, to accept that the former should
take precedence over the latter. However, his approach is not about
providing ways for ordinary citizens to participate in constitutional
change, but about the ways in which government might be able to get the
support of We the People and speak in its name. Solving the tension
between constitutionalism and democracy, then, does not require any
major institutional transformations (as constitutionalism does not place
any limits on dualist democracy’s People), but theorists that, sensible to
dualist democracy, are able to discern between constitutional and normal
politics.
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II. A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE
The previous review of Dworkin's, Waldron's, and Ackerman's
contributions to the constitutionalism-democracy debate hinted on what I
think are some of the democratic shortcomings of these author's proposals.
Dworkin and Ackerman are perfect apologists of the constitutional status
quo: according to them, there is a way of understanding the prevailing
'balance' between constitutionalism and democracy that cherishes and
respects the democratic ideal. And while Waldron sees a problem in some
contemporary constitutional regimes, it is a problem which is solved by
the abolition of the institution of judicial review of legislation. However,
as will become clear later, regardless of the position one takes on the
democratic or undemocratic character of giving judges the power to strike
down ordinary laws, one will still come short of advancing a truly
democratic project if arguing in favor or against this institution is all one
does. Democracy is of course inconsistent with permanent constitutions
and appeals to a People that acts in mysterious ways, but it is not
exhausted by parliamentary supremacy either. It is, on the contrary, a
much richer ideal, and if the constitutionalism-democracy debate is to be
taken to another level the approaches represented in the work of these
three authors must be subject to a democratic critique, one that defends a
strong and participatory conception of democracy.xxxii
In this section of the paper I will confront the proposals of these three
authors with an alternative approach. Against Dworkin, I will argue that
the constitutional conception is in conflict with democratic openness (the
idea that all laws, including fundamental ones, must be permanently open
to important transformations through highly democratic procedures).
Democratic openness, together with popular participation, is one of the
basic components of the democratic ideal. Against Waldron, I maintain
that there is more to democracy and popular participation than
majoritarian decision making inside legislatures: democracy has a second
dimension that asks us to look at the ways ordinary citizens can change the
fundamental laws. Finally, against Ackerman, I argue that a genuinely
democratic constitutional change mandates the actual participation of
citizens in constitutional politics, which is quite different from getting the
support of the People or being able to speak in its name.
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A. DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCEPTION
What Dworkin' constitutional conception of democracy does is to set the
traditional content of a liberal constitution as democracy's precondition.
Under this view, democracy is exhausted by the right content; the only
objective of such a conception is to ensure the protection of an
‘exemplary’ constitution, a constitution whose provisions meet Dworkin
standards. In fact, the very idea of ordinary people meddling with the
content of a 'good' constitution is a threat to this conception of democracy,
and that is why Dworkin favors an amendment procedure that makes
constitutional change difficult and unlikely. For him, majorities should not
be allowed, “whenever they wish, to change the basic constitutional
structure that seems best calculated to ensure equal concern”xxxiii . Put in a
different way, under the constitutional conception, there could be a
democracy under a ‘given’ constitution. That is to say, someone (say a
group of Western experts) writes a constitution that provides for an
elective legislative assembly and the protection of traditional liberal rights
and tells a group of people: ‘here is your democratic constitution, now
follow it (but don't change it) and govern yourselves ‘democratically’’.
Contrary to what Dworkin believes, this approach is in clear and direct
conflict with democracy, as it negates one of the basic components of this
ideal. It is true that democracy is one of the most contested terms of our
political culture, and that it is far from clear what it requires in the context
of large and complex societies. However, there are some basic ideas that
are inherent to the principle of ‘the rule by the people’ (democracy’s
specific and literal meaning).xxxiv Once one begins to depart from these
ideas democracy quickly becomes something else. One of these ideas is
that a democratic society is an open society, that is, one in which even the
most fundamental principles are open for discussion and are always
susceptible of being reformulated or replaced. Democratic openness
welcomes conflict and dissent, and it is incompatible with untouchable
abstract principles. To paraphrase Castoriadis, a democratic society is “not
a society that has adopted just laws, once and for all, rather is a society
where the question of justice remains constantly open”.xxxv
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The conception of an open society is directly related to the principle of the
‘rule by the people’ in one fundamental sense. To say that the people rule
themselves is to say that they are a ‘self-governing’ people: a group of
human beings that come together as political equals and give themselves
the laws that will regulate their conduct and the institutions under which
they live. This involves two important and related points. First, for these
rules to be the people’s own, it must be today’s people who rule, not past
generations or political philosophers, however wise or well-intentioned
their act of constitution-making was, or whatever the content of the
provisions they adopted. The idea of pre-commitment (perfectly attuned to
the logic of constitutionalism) cannot be brought to a final reconciliation
with democracy.xxxvi Second, for there to be democratic self-rule, no rule
can be taken for granted or removed from critique and revision.xxxvii A
self-governing people must be able to reformulate their commitments
democratically. In this sense, the idea of placing stringent requirements for
constitutional amendments, or of placing part of the constitutional text
outside the scope of democratic politics, is in clear tension with the ideal
of democratic openness and with the very idea of the rule by the people.
As Claude Lefort has put it, democracy allows “no law that can be fixed,
whose articles cannot be contested, whose foundations are not susceptible
of being called into question”xxxviii .
Dworkin's approach, in which there is such a thing as a constitution that
contains the right abstract principles, negates democratic openness in
important ways. His conception of democracy is perfectly consistent with
a finished constitution: a constitution that might be improved by correcting
some historical mistakes here and there (through judicial
interpretation)xxxix, but whose fundamental principles and the
governmental structure it creates should not be susceptible to change by
highly democratic procedures.xl If a constitution contains the right abstract
principles (the rights and institutions that promote equal concern and
respect) and if judges are allow to interpret and re-interpret its provisions,
why should we be concerned about how it came into existence, or why
would someone ever want to re-write its fundamental provisions?
Dworkin's solution to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma might
promote the production of ‘good’ laws (under his standards), but it is
much more about keeping constitutionalism untouched than about
realizing democracy. Now, it is true that to say that in a democracy
everything is open for replacement is to accept that democracy always
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involves the risk of replacing itself. Democracy, there should be no doubt
about it, is always a risk, but a risk that a democrat -if she wishes to
remain a democrat- has no choice but to accept. To do otherwise would
mean sacrificing the creativity of ordinary people together with the
possibilities of creating more just societies for the fear of a citizenry that,
through highly participatory and inclusive procedures, is willing to give up
the very institutions that make their self-government possible.xli

B. THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND PARLIAMENTARY
SUPREMACY
Unlike Dworkin, Waldron takes seriously the ideal of democratic
openness. For him, the meaning and scope of every constitutional
provision (if there happens to be a written constitution), should be
determined by the elected legislature, not by a group of judges. I believe
that Waldron's approach is democratically superior to that of Dworkin's. It
has, however, an important limitation: it only seems to conceive
democratic openness in the context of what I will call the first dimension
of democracy (democratic governance). If the legislature and the people
are identified with each other (as in Waldron) the actual role of the latter
in debating and reformulating the basic principles of the constitutional
regime will be quite limited, to say the least. It should be clear that this is
not an argument against representative democracy, but an argument that
points to a (second) dimension of democracy (democracy at the level of
the fundamental laws) in which ordinary representative institutions should
give way to more participatory mechanisms. Democratic openness must be
an openness accessible to ordinary citizens, not confined to the four walls
of a legislature. In this section I will distinguish between these two
dimensions of the democratic ideal and argue that Waldron's conception
(like most theories that focus in the legitimacy of judicial review) operate
exclusively in the domain of democratic governance.
When people say that a certain country is ‘democratic’ they are usually
referring to democracy at the level of governance. That is, they are saying
that that country’s laws and institutions provide for frequent elections, that
citizens are allowed to associate in different organizations (including
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political parties) and to express their political opinions without fear of
punishment. In short, they are making the observation that the country in
question satisfies the requirements of what Robert Dahl has identified as
polyarchy.xlii In this sense, democratic governance has to do with the daily
workings of a state’s juridical apparatus and with the processes that result
in the adoption of the ordinary laws and policies. For instance, an
unelected upper house (like the Canadian Senate) and the debate over
districting in countries such as the United States are problems of
democratic governance, as well as issues like the restriction of campaign
finances, the legitimacy of judicial review, proportional representation,
and the equal treatment of citizens by a state bureaucratic apparatus. In
this respect, democratic governance is also related in important ways with
the content of the fundamental laws: Does the constitution provide for
universal suffrage? Does it establish an elected legislature? Does it respect
basic liberties? If in the context of a particular constitutional regime
questions like these are to be answer in the negative, democratic
governance would be impossible.
The second dimension of democracy deals with other questions. It is not
about the daily workings of the state’s political apparatus, but about the
relation of the people to their constitution. It does not focus on the
adoption or content of ordinary laws or on who should have the final word
to interpret existent constitutional provisions, but on how constitutional
regime came into existence and how it can be altered. These are questions
about the ways in which citizens can participate in constitution-making
and constitutional reform and, as I stated in the introduction, I think they
should be the natural focus of the constitutionalism-democracy debate.
With regards to constitution-making, the second dimension of democracy
is incompatible with ‘given’ constitutions, regardless of how liberal or
wise their content might be: the (democratic) constitution-maker should
not find any principles already sedimented into the future constitutional
regime. In the context of constitutional reform, democracy is incompatible
with the idea of a constitution that, reputed to contain the right abstract
principles, should never be meddled with. When important juridical
transformations are needed, it mandates a process that attempts to
reproduce a democratic constitution-making episode. Because the exercise
of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws is episodical by nature,
it is more compatible with extraordinary and highly participatory
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processes which are difficult or impossible to put in practice at a daily
level.xliii
While Waldron's approach is more consistent with democracy than that of
Dworkin's, both authors proceed as if democratic governance enclosed all
forms of democratic politics. Waldron limits himself to give to the
legislative assembly what he takes away from the judiciary, rendering the
actual participation of citizens in framing the content of the fundamental
laws unnecessary. His assertion that every time there is a disagreement
about rights “the people whose rights are in question have the right to
participate on equal terms in that decision”xliv does not mean much if an
ordinary legislature will do all the work and the only role of the citizens is
that of electing legislators every few years. Waldron might not actually
think that democracy can be exhausted in a legislature, but his defense of
parliamentary supremacy and of the right to participate has nothing to say
about democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. To be fair to
Waldron, one might say that his approach does not exclude an account of
the second dimension of democracy, and that, in fact, it would be entirely
compatible with it. But this is precisely my critique: that his solution to the
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma, which involves a problematic
identification of people and legislature, operates only within the realm of
democratic governance. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Waldron
never addresses the fact that there might be more democratic and
participatory procedures for taking important decisions than the simple
rule of legislative majorities, especially for altering the content of the
constitution and expanding (or limiting) the scope of fundamental rights.

C. POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Ackerman avoids some of the problems that characterize Dworkin's and
Waldron's approaches. First, his theory expressly rejects the 'rights
foundationalism' of Dworkin and explicitly embraces democratic
openness: the People should be able to change the constitution in whatever
form it wishes, even in ways that circumvent the formal amendment
procedure. Second, Ackerman rejects Waldron's 'monism', clearly
distinguishing the People from the legislature. Failing to make this
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distinction, he thinks, is to misunderstand America’s dualist democracy.
Although Ackerman's theory has important similarities with the distinction
between the two dimensions of democracy, it has an important and
decisive difference: it does not tell us if constitutional politics require the
actual participation of citizens in important constitutional transformations,
other than expressing their assent for change. Even if the periods of
constitutional politics he identifies in American history were characterized
by mass mobilizations (which is by no means clear), they were mostly
driven by political elites. Ackerman’s take on popular participation in
constitutional reform is mainly about getting the support of the People,
about being able to speak in the People’s name. Constitutional politics is a
complex process that involves Congress, the Executive, and the Supreme
Court, and in which ordinary citizens only play the minor role of
expressing their support for change (in regular elections in particular).xlv
In other words, his conception of constitutional politics does not come
accompanied by mechanisms that would increase the participation of
citizens (like constituent assemblies convened 'from below' and popular
initiatives) in re-constituting the juridical system. The problem, of course,
is that the maximization of popular participation is, together with
democratic openness, one of the basic components of the democratic ideal.
That democracy mandates popular participation in the production of all
laws is almost axiomatic. Democratic self-government not only entails a
“community of citizens -the demos- [that] proclaims that it is absolutely
sovereign” (e.g. the ideal of democratic openness); it also involves an
affirmation of the “equal sharing of activity and power” of all citizens.xlvi
Democracy means ‘rule by the people’, and the people who invented it,
the Greeks, institutionalized this very definition in their juridical
arrangements. The most famous example is the 5th century Athenian
assembly, which was open to all male, adult, and free citizensxlvii and met
more than forty times a year.xlviii This institution rested on the premise that
common people were not only competent to elect their governors, but to
make political judgments about substantive issues.xlix
This is also how eighteenth century revolutionaries in Europe and the
United States understood democracy: as the rule of everyone by everyone.l
Modern critics, such as Jean Bodinli and Adam Fergusonlii, also
understood it in this way, and it is also why they opposed it.liii For them,
popular participation was by its very nature problematic: it necessarily
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included granting political power to the lower classes of society and that
was considered by itself a very good reason for discomfort. The American
Federalists were also in this ‘group’ and were not shy to show their fear of
democracy. For instance, James Madison warned that “[pure] democracies
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been
found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and
have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in
their deaths”liv. The Federalists not only understood democracy as
requiring popular participation, but offered ‘representative democracy’ as
an alternative.lv Madison even argued that the voice of the representatives
would be “more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
people themselves, convened for the purpose”lvi, and at some points
seemed to recommend a large federation (as opposed to a confederation of
autonomous entities) in order to make the kind of representative system he
favored necessary.lvii For both the Greeks and modern critics of
democracy, the meaning and practical implications of this ideal were
reasonably clear: democracy meant rule by the people and it required the
adoption of institutions that would result in the participation of all citizens
-to the extent possible- in all aspects of the activity of governing. For them
the rule of the people extended to all matters (which is why popular
participation represented a threat), including the creation and re-creation
of the fundamental laws; no issue was to be removed from the democratic
process.
It is not difficult to understand why popular participation is a basic
component of democracy: it respects the equality of all citizens,
recognizing their capacity to govern themselves by engaging in
discussions about fundamental substantive issues. A process of
constitutional change lead by experts or political elites expresses a
discomfort with democratic self-government, suggesting that some people
are better equipped to decide what is best for everyone. Popular
participation, however, has been moved to a secondary plane by many
influential accounts of democracy.lviii The usual argument for this move is
that, no matter how desirable, the maximization of popular participation is
not possible in large and complex societies. That, however, might be true
with respect to democracy at the level of daily governance (and in fact that
is the focus of those theories), but not with respect to episodes of
constitutional change. As such, any democratic theory of constitutional
change must engage in the production of proposals directed at increasing
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the role of ordinary citizens in the production of constitutional norms. A
constitutional theory that does not make such an effort, but instead focuses
on the production of arguments directed at showing that despite all
evidence to the contrary democracy reigns in liberal constitutional
regimes, hardly deserves the label 'democratic'. Unfortunately, Ackerman
does present neither arguments nor proposals for an increase in popular
participation, unless one understands popular participation to be exhausted
in the actions of a government that claims to act with the support of ‘We
the People’. Thus, while doing away with Waldron's identification of
people and legislature, Ackerman proceeds in a highly theoretical way,
without attempting to provide ways for flesh and blood human beings to
directly deliberate and decide about the content of their constitution.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE
Each of the approaches to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma
considered in this paper suffers from an important democratic deficit. It is
nevertheless possible to retrieve some democratic lessons from each. First,
Dworkin's emphasis on rights reminds us that regardless of the limitations
that some rights impose on popular decision-making, there is an important
connection between democracy and rights. That is, there are some rights
(such as freedom of association, the right to vote, and freedom of
expression) without which any meaningful democratic exercise would be
close to impossible. Second, Waldron's rejection of judicial review points
toward an inescapable consequence of any democratic constitutional
theory: important decisions should be, at the very least, in the hands of
elected institutions. Third, Ackerman's dualist theory forces us to see that
there is more to democracy than what happens inside parliaments, and that
democratic constitutional change does not always take place through
ordinary procedures. If one wants to construct a democratic constitutional
theory, however, these insights will not do: it is necessary to push
constitutionalism toward democracy instead of pulling democracy closer
to it, to upset the 'balance' between these ideals in favor of the latter. This
is precisely what the rest of the paper attempts to do: to move
constitutionalism toward a terrain in which citizens, not untouchable

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 19

principles, rule. In this next and final part of the paper I will consider the
institutional implications of the previous critique and advance a set of
substantive proposals.

A. WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutional democracy is the dominant theory (defended, in different
degrees and emphasis, by Dworkin, Waldron, and Ackerman) about what
should be the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, an
attempt to balance these two ideals. But it is neither the only theory nor
the only balance. It is possible to develop a conception of
constitutionalism that is more sensitive to the ideals of popular
participation and democratic openness. I call this conception weak
constitutionalism, which serves as the backbone of the proposals that I will
introduce in the next two sections. Weak constitutionalism, to use Unger’s
phrase, sees the constitution as “the creation and property of a free and
democratic people”lix, not as the exclusive domain of jurists and experts.
Because it takes seriously the idea of democracy at the level of the
fundamental laws, it does not perceive an active citizenry as a threat (even
when its actions might result in the destruction of the established
constitution and the emergence of a new one) but as the possibility of
correcting existing injustices. Unlike the traditional version of
constitutionalism, it does not see the liberal constitution as the incarnation
of just and universal principles. On the contrary, by taking constitutions as
what they inevitably are -the creation of human beings and the result of
political struggle- it recognizes the necessity of keeping the constitutional
regime open, or what is the same thing, the political terrain never closed.
In what follows, I outline the basic premises of a theory of weak
constitutionalism.
First, weak constitutionalism does not see constituent power (the power to
create and re-create constitutional regimes)lx as a threat. Unlike Dworkin's
conception of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, it
does not maintain the precedence of the constitutional forms over the
constituent power of the people. It rests on the idea that there is a
permanent and juridically unsolvable tension between the constitution and
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the political power under which it rests. Instead of privileging the
supremacy of the constitutional forms through a constitution that is
difficult or impossible to change, it recognizes the constitution as higher
law while leaving the door open for constituent power's future reemergence. By so doing, weak constitutionalism does not seek to resolve
this tension. On the contrary, it recognizes it as an inevitable consequence
of having a constitution and makes it even more obvious by giving citizens
the institutional means for acting together and take precedence over the
constitutional text, even if only episodically. Put differently, it allows for
the distinction between democratic governance and democracy at the level
of the fundamental laws to assume a real and practical meaning.
Second, weak constitutionalism comes accompanied by the idea, absent in
Waldron's approach, that important constitutional transformations should
not be the work of ordinary institutions. These institutions are designed to
operate at the level of daily governance, where the maximization of
popular participation is not possible. Weak constitutionalism is not about a
constitution that, just like ordinary law, can be easily changed by
democratic majorities if the term ‘democratic majorities’ simply refers to a
majority of state officials sitting in a legislature.lxi When an important
constitutional transformation is needed, it recommends that changes to the
constitution be made through an exercise of popular participation similar
to that present when the constitution was adopted in the first place (which
does not necessarily mean that it will be easier to alter the constitutional
text, but that the process for altering it must be highly participatory). The
issue here is not simply one of representative versus direct democracy.
Popular participation cannot be limited to a process in which experts draft
the constitutional text and then submit it to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in a
referendum; it involves a process in which citizens are allowed to propose,
debate, and decide on the content of their constitution.
Third, weak constitutionalism rests on a participatory conception of the
citizen. The citizen is not seen merely as a human being with rights that
participates in politics through the election of officials every four of five
years, but as someone who is allowed to take part of the (re)positing of the
norms that govern the state. In other words, a citizen is someone who
participates (not in Ackerman's sense but through actual extraordinary
mechanisms) in the democratic legitimation of the constitutional regime
and knows that, despite all the imperfections of such an order, it can be
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changed.lxii Not only this conception of the citizen is more consistent with
democracy but it might result in citizens developing a sense of
identification with the constitutional regime, seeing the constitution as
theirs, as their work-in-progress and not simply as the embodiment of the
collective will of a mysterious People.lxiii When important constitutional
transformations are needed, this active citizenry engages in different forms
of political participation in order to create the political climate necessary
for extraordinary mechanisms to be activated. The paradigmatic
institutions of weak constitutionalism are the constituent assembly
convened 'from below' and the popular initiative to amend the
constitution, which I consider in the next two sections of this paper.
Different versions of these institutions are already present in some
constitutional regimes. I present them here as mechanisms that a few
polities have adopted in order to ease the tension between
constitutionalism and democracy and as examples of the types of
proposals for change that a new wave of the constitutionalism-democracy
debate should focus on.

B. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES CONVENED 'FROM BELOW'
Constituent assemblies are usually convened for the adoption of a new
constitution or for a complete constitutional overhaul. In their 'democratic
variant'lxiv they are composed of directly elected delegates who have the
responsibility of drafting a new constitution or a set of amendments to an
already existing one (which are to be accepted or rejected by the electorate
in a referendum). The extraordinary power of these bodies is usually
defended through an appeal to their highly participatory and deliberative
nature. Ideally, such an assembly is convened in an episode of intense
popular mobilization for the specific task of altering the constitutional
regime, elected in a way that maximizes the participation of all sectors of
society (this is why some form of proportional representation is usually
present in constituent assemblies), and it is not subject by any limits found
in positive law.lxv The constituent assembly avoids the most salient
shortcomings present in the three approaches considered previously. As a
mechanism for the exercise of constituent power, it allows the citizenry to
approach the constitutional regime as radically open, susceptible to any
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kind of modification. As an extraordinary body, it is based on a distinction
between the ordinary legislature and the people, between constituted and
constituent powers. Finally, its episodical nature facilitates intense popular
participation in constitutional change: in its more democratic version
(which I will consider below), it can be triggered by citizens even with the
opposition of ordinary government.
There are at least two ways in which a constituent assembly can be
convened. The first is the most common of all, and it is present in several
constitutional regimes.lxvi It consists of an extraordinary body convened by
the ordinary representatives for introducing important changes to the
constitution. Because it is convened by the government and not by the
electorate, this kind of assembly only provides (from the perspective of the
citizens) the mere possibility of constitutional re-making through an
extraordinary and popularly elected body. There is, however, another
method for convening a constituent assembly. The constituent assembly
convened ‘from below’, triggered at the initiative of the citizenry as
opposed to that of the legislature, is a superior mechanism from the
perspective of democracy and weak constitutionalism. In fact, it alters the
conception of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy
under which most Anglo-American constitutional theorists operate by
seeing the citizenry as an extra-constitutional power (the constituent
power) that survives the adoption of a constitution. In that respect, it is
alien to the traditional conception of constitutionalism, according to which
a constitution signifies the beginning of the rule of law: the ‘channeling’
of constituent power through a settled (and ideally permanent)
constitutional form.lxvii The popular initiative to convene a constituent
assembly contradicts all of this. It attributes the people (as the mythical
creator of the constitution)lxviii , the faculty of re-activating its constituent
power and becoming the real founder of a radically transformed
constitutional regime.
This mechanism is about recognizing a power superior to the constitution
and giving the people, acting outside the ordinary institutions of
government, the institutional means for exercising it. The convocation of
such an assembly would be initiated by the collection of a number of
signatures that could range, say, from 15% to 20% of the electorate.lxix
After the required number is collected, a referendum would take place in
which the entire citizenry has the opportunity to decide whether the
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assembly should be convened. If the majority votes in the affirmative, the
election of the delegates to the constituent assembly would take place.
From then on, the assembly would be a sovereign body, independent of
the ordinary (or constituted) powers of government and would operate
according to its own rules. It would be authorized to replace the existing
constitutional regime and create an entirely new one. Its proposals, of
course, would have to be ratified by the electorate in an additional
referendum in order to enter into effect. Ironically, this type of mechanism
is beginning to appear not in the national constitutions of established
Western liberal democracies but in the recently adopted constitutions of
several Latin American countries.lxx
When triggered by the citizens themselves, a constituent assembly would
facilitate the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws
and would come very close to embody the ideals of democratic openness
and popular participation. On the one hand, a constituent assembly, as a
means for the exercise of constituent power, has no competencies and can
make any change in the constitutional regime, no matter how
fundamental.lxxi It can even result in the (unlikely) abolishment or
modification of the rights that make any democratic exercise possible and
in the alteration of the very amendment formula that provides for its
convocation, although if it does, it would destroy its very democratic
legitimacy together with that of the constitutional regime. On the other
hand, and unlike the constituent assembly convened exclusively by the
legislature, it recognizes the citizenry as the protagonist of important
constitutional transformations from beginning to end. For it to be a truly
open and participatory process, the onus that must be met in order to
activate the assembly should not be too high. The collection of the
signatures of less than a fifth of the registered electors seems reasonable in
this respect. It is true that after the initial stage of the process, a simple
majority of the electorate can reject the convocation of the constituent
assembly, but the public discussion about the future of the constitutional
regime that can take place around these exercises is by itself a valuable
democratic process.
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C. THE POPULAR INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION
Any democratic constitutional theory must recommend a participatory
means to propose and decide on changes that do not involve major
constitutional overhaul. This is the role that a popular initiative to amend
the constitution would play in a constitutional regime based in the theory
of weak constitutionalism: a more participatory version of the ordinary
amendment process. This mechanism of 'direct democracy' is present in
several European and Latin American constitutions, as well as in the
constitutions of several states of the U.S.lxxii It usually works in the
following way. A group of citizens drafts a proposal for amending the
constitution and collects the required number of signatures (usually around
10% to 15% of the registered electors) in order to be able to present the
proposal to the authorities. Once the proposal is presented and the
signatures validated, governmental authorities are required to submit it to
the people for their approval or rejection in a referendum. If the proposal
is approved, it immediately becomes part of the constitutional text. The
legislature is thus bypassed altogether (although in some countries, like
Uruguay, the legislature can present a counter proposal to be submitted to
the electorate together with the popular initiative), and the official
authorities have no choice but to provide the administrative tools that
allow citizens to exercise their power to change the constitutional text ‘by
themselves’.lxxiii
Although this mechanism departs from the tradition of top-down, elitedriven, constitutional change, it does not involve the level of deliberation
and participation that is present in constituent assemblies. Nevertheless,
the fact that this kind of mechanism depends on the collection of the
signatures of a great number of citizens creates the potential of activating
different sectors of society and promoting public discussion. At the same
time, however, it is more susceptible to manipulation by state officials or
private interests than constituent assemblies. For instance, it would be
relatively easy for a powerful economic actor to collect the required
number of signatures and then launch a persuasive media campaign in
order to obtain an affirmative vote in a referendum. Nevertheless, the
influence of powerful economic actors in popular initiatives should not be
exaggerated, and must be weighted with the power these actors already
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have over ordinary legislators, as well as with the fact that this mechanism
gives the citizenry an additional method for change. The scope of popular
initiatives would be the same as that of the ordinary amending power. That
is, they would be used to make those kinds of changes that the citizens
deem necessary but that do not warrant the convocation of a constituent
assembly. They would play the role, as John Calhoun once said of the
amending power in general, of the vis medicatrix of the constitutional
regime, the power to repair the constitution and not of radically
transforming it.lxxiv At the same time, they could be used to overrule the
decisions of the courts regarding the constitutionality of ordinary
legislation (if the system at hand allows for judicial review), and would
become especially useful to adopt changes that a legislature would not be
eager to adopt through the ordinary amendment procedure.
I want to end this final section with a brief comment about referendums.
Referendums play a central role in popular initiatives to amend the
constitution and are also present in the constituent assembly convened
'from below'. Democratic constitutional change, of course, is not
equivalent to the celebration of a referendum. From a democratic
perspective referendums are simply insufficient, and the widespread
assumption that they are an expression of the ultimate sovereignty of the
people, an exercise of constituent power, is based in an unfortunate
confusion.lxxv A referendum presents citizens with a set of pre-designed
alternatives that they cannot change, it does not allow citizens to put into
question and deliberate about different constitutional provisions, much less
about the constitutional regime as a whole. Dietrich Conrad expressed this
clearly when he wrote that the value of a constitutional referendum is
dubious, since it must be restricted “to a few questions to be answered yes
or no, since it does not give the people an active part in molding
constitutional details and is, at its best, more in the nature of an ultimate
veto power”lxxvi . Moreover, if citizens are asked to vote on a set of
disparate and complex proposals the referendum might turn into a mere
‘plebiscitary’ exercise, in which voters simply express against or in favor
of the government. A referendum does not guarantee the degree of
discussion and debate necessary for the maximization of the ideal of
popular participation either: citizens do not become authors of their
amended constitution but merely ‘consent’ to the proposed changes.
Popular referenda can also be manipulated by the media and strong
executives, they can send mixed messages when the turnout is low, and
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they do not involve the deliberation present in representative
assemblies.lxxvii
It is not surprising, then, that referendums have a bad reputation: from
Napoleon to Hitler, they have been used as a way of legitimating
authoritarianism and dictatorship.lxxviii Referendums are risky business,
but I think they are worth the risk. They are the method through which the
citizenry controls the work of the delegates elected to draft a new
constitution or the proposals presented by a group of citizens, the mode in
which the people decides that the constitutional changes in question are
‘theirs’. Of course, a referendum unaccompanied by public discussion is
never a good idea. As Sieyes argued more than two hundred years ago, the
exercise of popular sovereignty does not take place when people form
their opinions at home and simply bring them to the voting booth:
deliberation is essential.lxxix But in a process of constitutional change that
involves a high degree of popular mobilization and debate, a positive
referendum result can only add democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, as
Margaret Canovan has suggested, the added legitimacy “is due not so
much to the referendum procedure as to the popular mobilization that has
taken form around it”lxxx. In this sense, referendums are a central, but
flawed component of any democratic approach to the relationship between
constitutionalism and democracy.

IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
The constitutionalism-democracy debate did not live up to its potential.
The general approach followed by North-American constitutional
theorists, exemplified here through the works of Dworkin, Waldron, and
Ackerman, was characterized by presenting constitutionalism as the
democratic telos. Even theorists with strong democratic inclinations, like
Waldron, embarked in a defense of parliamentary supremacy and directed
their energies to attack judicial review, with the result of moving the
participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional change to a secondary
plane.lxxxi To approach the relationship between constitutionalism and
democracy from a decidedly democratic perspective, I have argued, is to
think about the ways in which citizens relate to the constitutional regime.
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In that sense, the adoption or rejection of judicial review is not as central
as the possibilities citizens have for proposing and deciding on important
constitutional transformations. The institution of judicial review of
legislation, in the context of democracy at the level of the fundamental
laws, is not a problem as long as it, like every other institution and
principle, is open to democratic reconsideration. A people might opt wrongly but through a democratic process- to experiment with judicial
review in the same way they might opt to experiment with other
institutions that suffer from fundamental democratic deficits (notice,
however, that in contemporary constitutional regimes this is not the case,
and judicial review presents itself almost as a 'natural' and immutable
feature of a just society).
Moving beyond the question of the legitimacy of judicial review allows us
to think about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy
in a new light. We are forced to look at the relationship between citizens
and constitutions, to the means of realizing democracy at the level of the
fundamental laws, instead of focusing our attention on who should have
the final word about the meaning of a constitutional provision. This, of
course, raises the stakes exponentially: constitutional theorists are no
longer supposed to decide which of two more or less predictive
institutions should enjoy more power (the judiciary or the legislature), but
obliged to test their confidence and prejudices about ordinary citizens. In
other words, the choice becomes that of trusting the political creativity of
the citizenry and proposing mechanisms to increase popular participation
in constitutional change, or to openly declare an honest and well
intentioned fear in giving political power to disorganized multitudes. It is
an overly political decision that does not sit comfortably with the world of
constitutions, principles, and reasoned adjudications, but that has the
potential of producing a new way of thinking about what it means to
propose a 'democratic constitutional theory' in the 21st century.
The proposals that I have considered here, the constituent assembly
convened 'from below' and the popular initiative to amend the
constitution, are examples, already present in a few constitutional regimes,
of institutions designed to increase the role of citizens in the production
and re-production of the laws that govern the state. In the same way, they
are consistent with weak constitutionalism's insistence in permanently
open constitutions. The adoption of institutions like these, if they ever
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become a regular component of the constitutional practice of modern
states, would signify a profound change from the 18th century tradition of
looking at “constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched”lxxxii and a move to a
conception in which constitutional change appears as the possibility of
correcting existing injustices, and citizens as democratic constitutionmakers.
i

In discussing the work of these three authors, my aim is to present an example of three
different tendencies in contemporary constitutional theory. The first of these tendencies,
represented in Dworkin's identification of constitutionalism and democracy and his
emphasis in the content of the constitution is also expressed in Stephen Holmes’ theory of
constitutional pre-commitment. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997). The second tendency, which I exemplify
through the work of Waldron and that focus on the counter-majoritarian character of
judicial review is also more or less present in the approaches of John Hart Ely, Mark
Tushnet, and Richard Parker. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994). In Canada, the work of Michael Mandel
is an example of this view, while proponents of dialogue theory, like Peter Hogg and
Kent Roach, stand in a sort of middle ground between the previous two positions, as they
try to avoid a total rejection of parliamentary supremacy, while at the same time
defending the institution of judicial review of legislation. See MICHAEL MANDEL, THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1994); Peter Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between
Courts and Legislatures: Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights isn't such a Bad Thing After
All, 35 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 75 (1997); KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT
ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001). Finally, the third
tendency, represented here in Ackerman's defense of the distinction between people and
legislature, is also present, in different degrees, in the work of authors such as Akhil
Reed Amar and Sanford Levinson. Although these authors make a genuine effort of
finding ways for a new non-Article V constitutional convention to be convened, they do
not engage in proposing specific institutional changes for increasing the participation of
ordinary citizens in the production of the fundamental laws. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 457 (1994); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). In
Canada, Peter Russell has implicitly adopted Ackerman's approach in his analysis of
Canadian constitutional history. See PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN
CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (1993).
ii
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R 217.
iii
Ibid. at para. 76. It is interesting to note here that the 'political representatives' of the
province of Quebec did not 'consent' to the 1982 constitutional changes (which among

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 29

other things created a new amending procedure).
iv
Ibid. at para. 77-78.
v
Fallo Núm. 17 of the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, January 19, 1999.
vi
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 197 (Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad eds.) (1988).
vii
FRANK MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1999).
viii
There are, of course, other type of approaches that could be also considered as
'solutions' to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma (in the sense that they seek to
ease the tension between these ideals) that depart in different ways to the ones
represented by Dworkin, Waldron, Ely. See for example Lawrence B. Solum, “Semantic
Originalism”, Illinois Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 07-24
(November 22, 2008); WILL WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
THE LIVING TREE (2007); Jack M. Balkin, “Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution”, Yale Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 182 (February 16. 2008).
ix
Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court,
28 ALBERTA L. REV. 324, 329 (1990).
x
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 16 (1996).
xi
Ibid. at 143.
xii
RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 134 (2006)
xiii
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 10, at 17.
xiv
MICHELMAN, supra note 7, at 16-18.
xv
Ibid.
xvi
“We may better protect equal concern by embedding certain individual rights in a
constitution that is to be interpreted by judges rather than by elected representatives, and
then providing that the constitution can be amended only by supermajorities”. Ibid. at
144. The problem is that this fear of constitutional change is not limited to the protection
of the political rights and institutions that allow democracy to take place; it extends to the
entire organization of government and the economy. Thus, when constitutional democrats
talk about protecting or advancing democracy by a constitution that is difficult to change
and protects basic democratic rights, they are protecting at the same time the traditional
liberal system of governance which comes accompanied by a conception of the market as
a central feature of democratic life. They are also making very difficult more profound
constitutional transformations that, while protecting and expanding basic democratic
rights, are incompatible with other aspects of liberal governance whose connection with
democracy is weak or non-existent.
xvii
Jeremy Waldron, Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW,
PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 08-35, 1; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT
SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996).
xviii
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 213 (1999).
xix
Ibid. at 250.
xx
Ibid. at 232.
xxi
Waldron is a defender of the principle of majority rule as a superior democratic

30

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

decision making method because it is “neutral between the contested outcomes, treats
participants equally, and gives each expressed opinion the greatest weight possible
compatible with giving equal weight to all opinions”. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1346, 1388 (2006).
xxii
Waldron, Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence, supra note 17, at 7.
xxiii
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 21, at 1349.
xxiv
For a critique of this aspect of Waldron’s thought, see Dimitrios Kyritsis,
Representation and Waldron’s Objection to
Judicial Review, 26 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 733 (2006).
xxv
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991).
xxvi
Bruce Ackerman, Neo-Federalism? in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 6, at 163. Ackerman identifies three periods of constitutional politics in U.S. history
(the founding, the Civil War amendments, and the judicial triumph of the New Deal).
xxvii
Ibid. at 167.
xxviii
Ibid. at 170.
xxix
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 72.
xxx
Ibid. at 11. For Ackerman, constitutional protection of human rights depends of a
prior democratic affirmation of higher law making. Nevertheless, Ackerman argues that
it would be a good idea for the U.S. to follow the lead of the German Constitution and to
entrench fundamental rights against abridgment by the People. Bruce Ackerman, Rooted
Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 533 (1994).
xxxi
Ibid. at 8.
xxxii
I take the phrase strong democracy from ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009) and BENJAMIN R. Barber, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984). I don’t think that the idea of ‘strong
democracy’ is merely ‘one version’ of the democratic ideal; I think it is the only version
that is consistent with the idea of the ‘rule by the people’.
xxxiii
DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 12, at 144.
xxxiv
Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry in ATHENIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59 (J. Peter
Euben et al eds.) (1994).
xxxv
Cornelius Castoriadis, Socialism and Autonomous Society 91 TELOS 104 (1980). See
also ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT
OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION (2000).
xxxvi
For a defense of pre-commitment, see Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6.
xxxvii
See ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION: DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS IN A TIME
OF POLITICAL CLOSURE 10 (2003).
xxxviii
Claude Lefort, The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism in POLITICAL FORMS OF
MODERN SOCIETY 303-304 (1986)
xxxix
It is true that Dworkin's constitution can be expanded through judicial interpretation
(what might make some constitutional theorists characterize it as being in a permanent
state of flux, rather than as a fixed document). See for example Waluchow, supra note 8.
Nevertheless, Dworkin's theory of constitutional interpretation involves important limits:
“Even a judge who believed that abstract justice requires economic equality cannot

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 31

interpret the equal protection clause as making equality of wealth, or collective ownership
of productive resources, a constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply
does not fit American history of practice, or the rest of the Constitution”. DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 10, at 11. To the extent that there are certain changes that
are simply out of the scope of a reasonable constitutional interpretation (at least at
particular historical moments), giving judges the power to expand the constitution, of
making constitutional principles “grow”, is not equivalent to the ideal of democratic
openness (of course, even if it were, there would still be an objection based on the
democratic aspect of democratic openness, since judicial interpretation is very far away
from being a democratic and participatory exercise). For the limits to “living tree
constitutionalism”, see also Edwards v. A.G. of Canada, [1930] A.C. 124: “The British
North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion
within its natural limits” (emphasis added).
xl
John Rawls’ view on the limits of constitutional reform is telling in this respect. Rawls
maintains that to be valid, a constitutional amendment must do one of the following: (1)
adjust basic constitutional values to changing political and social circumstances or
incorporate a broader understanding of those values (e.g. the Nineteenth Amendment,
which granted women the vote); (2) to remove weaknesses that come to light in
subsequent constitutional practice (e.g. the Twenty-second Amendment, limiting the
president to two terms). For Rawls, an amendment that goes beyond this objectives (like
one repealing the First Amendment) should be declared invalid by the courts. JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238-239 (2005)
xli
Constitutionalists frequently forget that if there are some forms of oppression (e.g.
slavery) that we consider unthinkable in contemporary liberal societies, it is not because
there are laws or constitutions against such practices, but because it would be hard to
imagine any group or individual with a political force capable of imposing them. See
Cornelius Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy in CASTORIADIS
READER 283 (David Ames ed.) (1997). The existence of the institutions that are usually
associated with democracy (e.g. freedom of expression, association, and the right to
vote), in the end, are less the consequence of the entrenchment of the relevant legal and
constitutional protections than a result of what may be identified as a “political culture of
mutual respect”. WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 18, at 310. See also
ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 172-173 (1989).Every constitutional regime
unaccompanied by a democratic culture, no matter how liberal its constitution and how
stringent its procedures for constitutional change, is always at risk. As Richard D. Parker
has put it: “Even if you feel a desire to believe in 'constitutionalism' strong-and-pure, you
should recognize that, like so many strong desires, this one can be satisfied only in the
clouds of fantasy. There are no supra-political guarantees of anything. All there is is
politics”. RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO 113-114 (1994).
xlii
DAHL, supra note 41.
xliii
This distinction is not meant to suggest that democratic governance and democracy at
the level of the fundamental laws are not related with each other: only the citizenry of a
strongly democratic polity, accustomed to vigorous democratic debate and participation
about the content of the ordinary laws, is likely to engage in the democratic reconstitution

32

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

of the fundamental laws. For the idea of democracy as episodical by nature, see Sheldon
Wolin, Fugitive Democracy in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla Benhabib ed.) (1996).
xliv
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 18, at 244.
xlv
Consider, for example, Ackerman's proposal of the 'Popular Sovereignty Initiative' as a
democratically superior alternative to Article V: “Rather than aiming for an Article Five
amendment, the vehicle for constitutional change should be a special statute that I will
call the Popular Sovereignty Initiative. Proposed by a (second-term) President, this
Initiative should be submitted to Congress for two-thirds approval, and should then be
submitted to the voters at the next two Presidential elections. If it passes these tests, it
should be accorded constitutional status by the Supreme Court”. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE II: TRANSFORMATIONS 415 (1998).
xlvi
Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, supra note 41, at 275.
xlvii
This limitations on citizenship are of course unacceptable under today’s standards, but
one must not forget that until the 20th century women did not have the right to vote in
many countries, and that it was only a few decades earlier that slavery was abolished in
some of the world’s ‘oldest democracies’.
xlviii
Claude Ake, Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalization and Democracy in
DEMOCRACY’S VICTORY AND CRISIS 282 (Alex Hadenius, ed.) (1997). It is not clear how
many Athenians attended the assembly regularly. A good measure might be Thucydides’
statement that there were usually 5,000 citizens at the meetings, and the fact that the
quorum required for some decisions was set at 6,000. See Christopher W. Blackwell, The
Assembly in DĒMOS: CLASSICAL ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY (A. Mahoney and R. Scaife,
eds.) (2003).
xlix
Meiksins Wood, supra note 34.
l
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
EMPIRE 240 (2004).
li
Bodin wrote described ‘popular states’ as “the refuge of all disorderly spirits, rebels,
traitors, outcasts who encourage and help the lowers orders to ruin the great. The laws
they hold in no esteem”. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 192-193
(1955).
lii
Ferguson, speaking during the 18th century, doubted that poor majorities, people who all
their lives had confined their efforts to their own subsistence, could be trusted with the
government of nations. Such men, he wrote: “when admitted to deliberate on matters of
state, bring to its councils confusion and tumult, or servility and corruption; and seldom
suffer it to repose from ruinous factions, or the effects of resolutions ill formed and ill
conducted”. ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 187 (1978).
liii
Ake, supra note 48.
liv
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 61 (Jacob Cooke ed.) (1961).
lv
Ake, supra note 48, at 283. See also Meiksins Wood, supra note 34, at 77. The problem
here is not the principle of representation itself (and it is not my purpose to pose a conflict
between direct and representative democracy), which is an inevitable part of any
contemporary political system, but the idea underlying it in the context of the American
experience: that the people should alienate their political power and that substantive
decisions must be left in the hands of ‘others’.

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 33

lvi

James Madison, Federalist 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 82 (Clinton Rossiter, ed.)
(1961).
lvii
“The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to
the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of
the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that,
however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be,
they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a
multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion
to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it
follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small
republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability
of a fit choice. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too
often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and
established characters”. See The Federalist no. 10, supra note 77. See also Ake, supra
note 48, at 283 and Meiksins, supra note 34, at 77.
lviii
See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1976); DAHL,
supra note 41.
lix
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996).
lx
The most famous formulations of constituent power can be found in the works of
Emmanuel Sieyes and Carl Schmitt. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD
ESTATE? (1963); CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2007). For a contemporary
discussion of this concept, see Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and
the Constituent Power, CONSTELLATIONS, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005) and the essays contained
in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds.) (2007).
lxi
Weak constitutionalism requires a degree of openness that is neither possible nor
desirable at the in the context of an ordinary legislature. Legislatures, regardless of their
relationship to the judiciary, operate under a constitutional regime. If a legislature is
granted the power to freely alter the constitution (even if subjected to procedural hurdles
not present in the adoption of ordinary laws) without the intervention of citizens,
democratic legitimacy is affected: it should be ordinary citizens the ones deciding on the
content of their constitution in a context of democratic openness. In addition, re-writing a
constitution often means altering the ways in which legislative power is exercised (e.g.
substituting a bicameral legislature with a unicameral one, introducing institutions such
as recall referendums, etc.). Having the legislature deliberating and deciding about those
kinds of changes would amount to a violation of the old principle that no one should be a
judge in his own case. On this point, see Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the
Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, 14 CARDOZO LAW REV. 661, 668
(1993).
lxii
Ibid. at 211.
lxiii
For an overview of the discussion about the ways in which an active citizenship can

34

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

enhance civic virtue and improve the quality of democratic governance, see Frances
Hagopian, Latin American Citizenship and Democratic Theory in CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN
AMERICA (Josepg S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg eds.) (2007). See also Michael Walzer,
The Civil Society Argument in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP (Ronald Beiner ed.) (1995) and
ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
(1993).
lxiv
It is possible to label any kind of body as 'constituent assembly', even one composed
by a set of 'delegates' appointed by a dictator.
lxv
The first of these two requirements are directly connected with what I identified earlier
as the ideal of popular participation, and the third, to the ideal of democratic openness.
lxvi See for example the constitution of Russia (Article 135) and Colombia (Article 376).
It can be argued that the convention contemplated by Article V of the U.S. Constitution is
the equivalent of a constituent assembly. There are at least two problems with thinking
about Article V in terms of constituent power, when this concept is understood in light of
its democratic implications. The first problem has to do with the ideal of popular
participation. Although an Article V convention could well result from pressure from
below, the process to convene it is perfectly attuned to top down constitutional change.
Moreover, there are no clear rules about how the members of this convention would be
elected or whether it could be formed of ordinary legislators, and the text of the article
does not require proposals to be ratified by the electorate. The second problem has to do
with democratic openness: the process required for the convocation of an Article V
convention is so difficult that it has never been used in more than 200 years of
constitutional history. For an analysis of the difficulties in calling an Article V
convention, see Levinson, supra note 1.
lxvii
Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations
on the Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
635, 643 (1993).
lxviii
Mythical because, in practice, most constitutions are not adopted through highly
democratic procedures and people are usually born into an already constituted
constitutional regime.
lxix
The idea here is not to set the threshold too high so as to make the triggering of the
constituent assembly impossible, but at the same time not setting it so low that a minority
that does not have the support of large sections of the population (but perhaps plenty of
economic resources) can easily initiate a process of constitutional reform. The few
constitutions that allow for the convocation of a constituent assembly ‘from below’
require 12% - 20% of the signatures registered electors (Ecuador 12%, Venezuela, 15%,
Bolivia 20%).
lxx
For instance, the constitution of Venezuela (Articles 347-348) and Ecuador (Article
444), as well as the new constitution of Bolivia recognizes the constituent assembly
convened from below. The case of the Bolivian constitution is the most interesting, as its
Article 408 not only attributes to ordinary citizens the power to convene a constituent
assembly, but specifically states that important constitutional transformations must be
adopted through this kind of body: “The total reform of the Constitution, or those
modifications that affect its fundamental principles, its recognized rights, duties, and
guarantees, or the supremacy of the constitution and the process of constitutional reform,

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 35

will take place through a sovereign Constituent Assembly, activated by popular will
through a referendum. The referendum will be triggered by popular initiative, by the
signatures of at least twenty percent of the electorate; by the Plurinational Legislative
Assembly; or by the President of the State. The Constituent Assembly will auto-regulate
itself in all matters. The entering into force of the reform will require popular ratification
through referendum”.
lxxi
I think that this mechanism, although contained in the constitution and in that sense
part of the legally constituted order, should be understood as a means to exercise
constituent power (at least in those moments in which it is used to radically transform the
established constitutional order or to create a new one, in a context of intense popular
mobilization). Moreover, I maintain this is consistent even with Schmitt's theory of
constituent power. What I mean by this is the following. Schmitt argued that constituent
power could not be limited by positive law or regulated by any legal procedures; the will
of the constituent subject was for him an “unmediated will”. Schmitt, supra note 60, at
132. In other words, no constitution can confer constituent power or prescribe the ways
it is initiated: the constituent subject (the people in a democracy) can (re)determine its
form of political existence whenever it decides such an action necessary. Ibid. But while
constituent power activates itself through the making of a fundamental political decision,
the “further execution and formulation of a political decision reached by the people in an
unmediated form requires some organization, a procedure, for which the practice of
modern democracy developed certain practices and customs. These are considered below
[he goes on to consider (a) the national assembly that drafts and passes constitutional
legislation; (b) The assembly that drafts constitutional norms followed by a popular vote
or other express confirmation, direct or indirect, of the drafts by the state citizens with the
right to vote; (c) constitutional conventions of federal states that are submitted to the
people of each state; (d) general popular vote of a proposal or a new order and regulation
of indeterminate origins]”. Ibid. at 132-134 (emphasis added). Otherwise, the constituent
subject would remain in a state of powerlessness and disorganization, unable to transform
its will into law.
lxxii
See for example Article 138 of the Constitution of Switzerland and Article 331 of the
Constitution of Uruguay. The increasing use of the popular initiative to amend the
constitution in states of the U.S. has been the object of many critiques. One of the most
pressing concerns is the development of a commercial industry devoted to the collection
of signatures. See for example, Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The
Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1996). It is also
interesting to note that while in the context of the several states of the U.S. the popular
initiative has been used to adopt amendments that affect the rights of some groups (the
most recent example being the constitutional prohibition of same sex marriage adopted in
California in 2008) it has also been used to make modifications of a progressive nature.
So, while in Colorado and Oregon the popular initiative was used in 1992 with the
purpose of discriminating against homosexuals it was also used to recognize women’s
suffrage in the 19th and 20th centuries. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An
Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. OF COLORADO L. REV. 13
(1995).
lxxiii
This mechanism has been used recently in Uruguay in order to stop the

36

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

privatization of state enterprises. For instance, in 2004, a popular initiative was used to
include the ‘right to water’ in the constitutional text in order to prohibit the privatization
of the water sector. In this particular case, after the signatures were presented to the
government, the required referendum took place and 64% of the population voted in
favor of the proposed amendments (with a participation of 90% of registered voters). See
CARLOS SANTOS, AGUAS EN MOVIMIENTO: LA RESISTENCIA A LA PRIVATIZACIÓN DEL
AGUA EN URUGUAY (2006). More generally, see David Altman, Democracia Directa en el
Continente Americano: ¿Autolegitimación Gubernamental o Censura Ciudadana?,
POLÍTICA Y GOBIERNO, Vol XII, Núm. 2 (2005).
lxxiv
See JOHN CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN CALHOUN (Richard K. Cralle ed.) (1968).
There is a body of literature that focuses on the distinction between a constitutional
amendment and the adoption of a new constitution (which usually is presented in the
context of an argument in favor of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendments. That distinction if relevant here, but to consider it would require a new
paper. See for example, William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power,
33 HARVARD L. REV. 223 (1920); Schmitt, supra note 60; CARL J. FRIEDRICH,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA (1950); Walter Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 703 (1980); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE
INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION (1993); Gary Jeffrey Jacobson, An Unconstitutional
Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2006). For a recent judicial consideration of the theory of
unconstitutional amendments in a state of the United States, see Strauss v. Horton,
_________ (2009), where the Supreme Court of California upheld the constitutional
prohibition of same-sex marriage.
lxxv
Consider for example the following statement by Pierre Trudeau, on the
announcement that nine Canadian Provinces (Quebec excepted) reached an agreement
regarding the patriation of the constitution and the adoption of and amendment formula):
“I have only one regret. I put it on record. I will not return to it. I have the regret that we
have not kept in the amending formula a reference to the ultimate sovereignty of the
people as could be tested in a referendum”. Cited in GRAHAM FRASER, RENÉ LÉVESQUE
AND THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS IN POWER 298 (2001).
lxxvi
Dietrich Conrad, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power in
THE INDIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 403 (1966-1967).
lxxvii
James Tully, The Unfreedoms of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of
Constitutional Democracy, THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 65 (March 2002) at 213.
There is empirical evidence that contradicts the common argument that referendums are
easily manipulated by strong executives. For example, David Altman has demonstrated
that in Latin America, referendums convened by the executive have around a 50%
success rate. See David Altman, Democracia Directa en el Continente Americano:
¿Autolegitimación Gubernamental o Censura Ciudadana?, POLÍTICA Y GOBIERNO, Vol.
XII, Núm. 2 (2005).
lxxviii
MARGARET CANOVAN, THE PEOPLE 108 (2005). For a comparative and
historical study of the referendum, see MARKKU SUKSI, BRINGING THE IN THE PEOPLE: A
COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND PRACTICES OF THE REFERENDUM (1993).

2009] THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 37

lxxix

Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.
JOURNAL 364, 387 (1995). John Dewey expressed this view clearly when he wrote:
“Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it
never is merely majority rule…The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is
the most important thing: antecedent debates, modification of views to meet the opinions
of minorities…The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and
conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion”. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 207 (1954).
lxxx
CANOVAN, supra note 77, at 113-114.
lxxxi
A notable exception here is Allan C. Hutchinson which, in addition to being a critic of
judicial review, moves beyond the judicial/parliamentary supremacy dichotomy towards
an emphasis in popular participation in ordinary law making and constitutional change
(including a proposal for Jeffersonian assemblies to be convened every decade or so).
Allan C. Hutchinson, A 'Hardcore' Case Against Judicial Review, 121 HARV. LAW. REV.
FORUM 57, 58 (2008).
lxxxii
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816 in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1975) at 558-559.

